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The Role of Board in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Normative Compliance 
Perspective 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper focuses on the board’s influence on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) among Public Liability Companies (PLCs). The paper uses normative compliance 
theory to develop the theoretical framework thereby advocating and complementing other 
theories CSR. 
 
Methodology: The paper adopts balanced random effect regression model to estimate the 
relationship between board characteristics (such as board composition, diversity and size on 
CSR, while controlling for firm size, sector and risk). This involved the use of balanced panel 
data of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. The random effect estimator is used to test the specific 
effects of the board composition, board size and board diversity on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. 
The data are obtained from Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) fact book from 2003 to 2009. 
 
Findings: The paper found that Non-executive directors (NEDs) and board size are positively 
significantly correlated with CSR, while the executive director was negative and significantly 
related with CSR. 
 
Originality: The testing of the theory in the context of Nigeria contributes to the body of 
knowledge on sub-Sahara Africa, particularly Nigeria which offers a developing country 
perspective. The paper explores the relationship between board characteristics and CSR 
thereby contributing to the governance processes of listed companies and how good 
governance should be encouraged by understanding the board dynamics. 
 
Study Contribution: The implication is that, for managers and corporations focusing on 
shareholder interest, must also acknowledge that the society wants companies to 
accommodate multiple stakeholders interest for them to compete and survive in the long run. 
 
Social Implication: The social implications for companies to understand that business and the 
society are interwoven. Also efforts should be made by the board and companies to be 
morally and socially responsible to the society. 
 
Limitations: The data employed for this paper is majorly limited to listed companies on the 
NSE and the study covers only firms and industrial sectors within a single country but do not 
cover country to country differences or factors.  It nevertheless presents implications for 
understanding CSR challenges in developing markets and provides insights into how to 
structure the board of listed companies. Finally, we hope this paper encourages future studies 
on the board dynamics and social performance of companies. 
  
Keywords: Board of directors, Board size, Board composition, Board diversity, Corporate 
Social Responsibility, Public Liability Companies, Nigeria. 
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The Role of Board in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Normative Compliance 
Perspective 
1. Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is gaining attention and prominence both in the 
business and academic community (Beesley and Evans, 1978; Carroll, 1991; Rao and Tilt 
2016; Hoi et al., 2018; Yuan et al., 2020) thereby putting more pressure on companies to 
become more accountable to stakeholders (Aras and Crowther, 2008a; Benson et al, 2009; 
Bingham et al, 2010; Sandberg, 2011). This development has made the board of directors 
central to making strategic decisions and policies that not only help the companies better their 
financial performance but also guarantee their continual survival in a competitive global 
market (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Broadly speaking, pressure groups and stakeholders are demanding that business organisation 
formulates CSR policies that favour various stakeholders including employees, shareholders 
and others (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Carroll, 1999; Kassinis and 
Vafeas, 2002; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006, Wahba, 2010). As a result, the society expects 
companies and their board to be stakeholder oriented by being good corporate citizens 
(Freeman, 1984; Amaeshi et al, 2006). Recently, stakeholders such as shareholders, 
employees, communities and public environmentalists, expect companies to manage, mitigate 
or prevent the adverse social and environmental impacts that may be associated with a 
company’s operations (Mahoney and Thorn, 2006; Altschuller, 2011).  
 
In companies, decisions and influence on CSR policies are being made by employees 
implying that they are centrally important in deploying CSR strategies (Greening and Turban, 
2000; Brammer et al., 2009). As a result, an effective CSR program was implemented 
through corporate-level policies and standards and supported by oversight mechanisms, 
training programs and accountability measures. The CSR programs ensure that companies are 
responsive to these social concerns. Likewise, the top management team (TMT) and the 
board (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) were responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of CSR policies that serves the interest of all stakeholders (Coffey and Wang, 
1998; McGuire et al, 1988; 2003; Galbreath 2017). In this regard, the paper examines the 
board co-ordination, influence and orientation towards CSR. 
 
Failure to address stakeholder concerns effectively can expose companies to a range of 
financial and non-financial risks, including loss of access to finance, poor employee morale, 
community opposition and heightened exposure to regulatory fines and lawsuits (Del Brio et 
al, 2006; Altschuller, 2011). Adverse impacts, even those that result from a single incident, 
expose companies to lasting reputational damage (Brammer et al., 2009). This reputational 
harm can impair a company’s capacity to leverage relationships with key public and private 
stakeholders and to implement short- and long-term business strategies (Gabrielsson, 2007; 
Goss and Roberts, 2009). While directors may recognize these concerns and the strategic 
value of CSR initiatives, recent studies have found that board oversight of social and 
environmental practices are lacking (Ogbechie et al, 2009; Wahba, 2010; Altschuller, 2011).  
 
It was noted also that CSR is multidimensional in nature (Husted, 2000; Wood, 1991; Carroll, 
1991; Maroun 2020) resulting in different CSR meaning and empirical findings (Carroll, 
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1999; Aguilera et al. 2006). As such, several authors have attempted to define CSR from 
different perspectives (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; 
Carroll, 1999). Carroll (1979) defined CSR based on social issues using four principles such 
as economic, ethical, legal and philanthropy responsibility. Carroll (1979) illustrates this in a 
pyramid form by stating that the economic responsibility is more important to the company 
followed by ethical, legal and philanthropic responsibility. Others defined CSR based on 
stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984; Agle et al, 1999), while the European Commission 
(2006) views CSR as a concept and voluntary practises by firms to widen their responsibility 
to include social and environmental concern with the goal of satisfying a wider stakeholder 
group such as shareholders, employees, customers, society, community, environment and 
suppliers.  
Social and environmental issues have been known to cause legitimacy problems for 
companies in communities where they operate (Webb, 2004; Wahba, 2010; Gul et al., 2020); 
example of such is the oil spillages by big oil companies such as Shell, Chevron and British 
Petroleum (BP). The question therefore is whether board characteristics matter to social 
performance? While the board role on CSR may be the main issue of discourse in the 
developed countries such as the United States of America (USA) and Europe, coupled with 
the fact that empirical evidences and research studies abound in these areas, the same cannot 
be said of the developing countries such as Africa (Ezirim et al, 2005; Amaeshi et al, 2006; 
Rwabizambuga, 2007; Amaeshi and Amao, 2008; Wahba, 2010). 
Hence, this study focuses on Nigeria and the effect of board characteristics on CSR practices 
of publicly listed companies (PLC) thereby adding to the body of literatures and the debate 
on CSR. From that rationale, this study discusses the following: the theoretical literature and 
conceptual framework, methodology, finding and discussion followed by conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Literature  
In corporate governance and social responsibility extant literature, the agency, stewardship, 
resource dependence and stakeholder theories have been used frequently to explain the 
rationale between the role of top management team in this case the board and CSR (Jensen, 
1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; McGuire et al, 2003; Webb, 2004; Norman, 2011). While the 
agency theory focuses on incentives to monitor executive managers and ensure that diversity 
of opinions promote board independence, the opposite is true for normative compliance 
theory that view the board as having the moral imperative to make policies that better the 
environment (Carroll, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Notably, the society places a moral 
imperative on companies to uplift the community they operate in by making the public a 
better place. Therefore, this study adopts the normative compliance theory in exploring the 
link between the board and CSR, thereby contributing to the body of literature. 
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2.1 Normative Compliance Theory 
 
The normative compliance theory expects the board to influence the company to make 
contribution to the community (Lunenburg, 2012). The theory derives its meaning from the 
compliance theory, a psychological theory concerning changing one's behaviour due to a 
request or direction of another person or group (Breckler et al., 2006; Lunenburg, 2012). 
Sometimes it involves changing behaviour to fit within the group, while still disagreeing with 
the group. Breckler et al. (2006) states that compliance refers to a change in behaviour that is 
requested by another person or group to influence the behaviour of a person in a certain way 
because others asked him or her to do so while having the choice to refuse or decline. 
 
This means the company and board were originally expected to satisfy shareholders alone 
(Jensen, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) but recently companies 
are being forced by the society in general to pursue a more inclusive stakeholder oriented 
approach. Therefore, the normative compliance theory argues that companies have the moral 
obligation to satisfy various stakeholders including the community, shareholders and 
employees. It hinges on the fact that businesses and societies are interwoven rather than 
separate entities. The above definition of CSR highlights and supports this assertion (Carroll, 
1979; Agle et al, 1999). However, according to Sacconi (2007) compliance theory suffers 
from motivational and trust gap thereby rendering enforcement and implementation 
ineffective. Also, Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) in explaining compliance behaviour by 
companies argue that compliance to regulation or practice is anchored on not only on the 
severity and certainty of sanctions but also on moral obligation and social costs. 
 
Some scholars (Norman, 2011) believe that the boards are not only influenced by the society 
but also by the need to gain legitimacy to engage in CSR. In other words, the fines and also 
the need to maintain corporate reputation influence companies to engage in CSR (Brammer et 
al, 2009). Moreover, normative compliance theory expects the board and companies to invest 
in CSR. Certainly, the directors in the board are expected to use their knowledge, experiences 
and skills to create policies, strategies and programs that enhance corporate performance of 
companies (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), such as corporate social performances. If this is 
not done, companies may be perceived to be indifferent to its corporate and social 
responsibilities function and therefore adjudged to be irresponsible hurting its legitimacy and 
reputation (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Wahba, 2010). 
Therefore, in order to avoid these fines and fees, companies with good social responsibility 
values strives to satisfy its stakeholders.  
 
2.2 The Relationship between the Board and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The board as earlier mentioned is responsible for making decision and policies of companies 
particularly policies that addresses social concerns (oil spills and climate change). In this 
regard, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who run the day to day affairs of the company are 
also expected to perform their duties in a way that serves the best interest of not only the 
shareholders but to other stakeholders (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Coffey and Wang, 
1998). The board have initially been accused for the abuse of power and poor performances 
of companies (Daily and Dalton, 1994). For instance, corporate scandals have been attributed 
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to directors such as the case of Enron collapse which further increased the pressure of 
companies to be more ethical in their approaches (McGuire et al, 2003; Webb, 2004).  
 
Previous studies on the characteristics of the board and CSR are in developed countries and 
the results are varied and uncertain (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Rodriguez-Dominguez et 
al, 2009). However, there are very little studies on the effect of the board characteristics on 
CSR practices in developing countries (Yongqiang, 2008), particularly in Nigeria where there 
are no studies or scanty research on CSR (Helg, 2007). Hence, there exists a gap on the 
impact of board characteristics on CSR in developing country. This study attempts to fill this 
gap using the balanced panel data of 174 Public Listed Companies (PLCs) from Nigeria 
between 2003 and 2009 on CSR to investigate and identify the effect of the board size, board 
composition and board diversity on CSR.  
 
2.3 Formation of Hypothesis: Board Composition and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The variation of composition of board and how it affects CSR has attracted many scholars 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Webb, 2004, Galbreath 2017). Some 
argue for directors’ independence in the board (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Kemp, 2011), while others 
suggest board enlargement as a way of addressing the social and environmental concerns 
(Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Wahba, 2010). In their study, Coffey and 
Wang (1998) argue for the enlargement of board, by introducing more Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs) into the board as a way of strengthening their independence and their 
ability to focus on CSR. They noted that NED helps the board to improve its strategic 
processes and stakeholder’s representations.  The presence of NED in the board is one of the 
solutions offered in the monitoring of management and a way of avoiding corporate collapse 
(Kesner et al, 1986; Daily and Dalton, 1994).  
 
Furthermore, the NEDs as part of the board help to monitor the executive directors in 
implementing CSR policies. Still, high expectations are required from the NEDs to create an 
effective and vigilant board aimed at limiting managerial hegemony and opportunism (Coffey 
and Wang, 1998; Schaffer, 2002; Sanda et al; 2010) and also enhance corporate and social 
performances (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). The NEDs confer independences to the board 
(Kesner et al, 1986); help to reduce CEO duality role by encouraging the separation of the 
joint structure role of CEO and chairperson to be handled by separate individuals and the 
monitoring role of management (Daily and Dalton, 1994).  
Fernandez-Gago et al., (2016) examined Spanish listed companies on IBEX 35 from a period 
of 2005 to 2010. They found that the percentage of independent directors has an effect on 
firm CSR activities. On the contrary, Salehi et al (2017) examined the effect of the structure 
of board of directors and company ownership on CSR disclosure of 125 listed companies on 
the Tehran Stock Exchange. They found there was no significant relationship between 
independent board of directors, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, family 
ownership and the level of CSR disclosure  
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Empirically, Johnson and Greening (1999) analysed the relationship between board 
composition and CSR by using secondary data and found a positive relationship between 
NED and CSR. Other previous empirical studies support the presence of NED in the board 
(Wang and Coffey, 1992; Coffey and Wang, 1998). Johnson and Greening (1999) found the 
inclusions of NED in the board to be positively related to CSR. Johnson and Greening (1999) 
suggest that NEDs bring their skills, connection and contact to the board; thereby 
encouraging the long-term survival of the company through the enhancement of product 
quality and good environmental practices with the aim of satisfying a wider group of 
stakeholders. Based on the above arguments and empirical findings, the following hypothesis 
was formulated. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between NED dominated board and CSR. 
However, there is a counter argument that executive directors are believed with time to 
become self serving or opportunistic (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). It 
is noted that the executive directors may suffer from conflict of interest as a result of their 
desire to retain loyalty from close associates or friends thereby compromising their position 
and power (Agle et el, 1999). Also, the executive directors may suffer from fear of revenge or 
retaliation from the CEO, who in most cases, appoint them into the board (Johnson et al, 
1996; Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2009). According to Johnson et al (1996) executive directors 
find it difficult to blame the CEO in periods of poor performances during boardroom 
meetings, particularly with CEO in attendance; as their presence, power and influence 
become prominent.  
Moreover, the agency theory usually views CSR activities by companies as anti-profit. 
Friedman (1970) argues that profit maximization is the sole responsibility of business 
organisations and the author further detests corporate attempts to invest in other stakeholders’ 
welfare such as environmental concern, consumers’ protection and employee welfare. Also 
supported by the above arguments are Hughes (2001) and Bakan (2004) that pointed out that 
the legal responsibility of companies is to make a profit for investors by providing goods and 
services demanded by the society. 
Also, oppose to NED pro-CSR agenda is Vance (1964) who argues that executive directors 
rather than the NEDs help to improve corporation’s performance when they are in the 
majority on the board. By so doing, they create wealth and satisfy shareholder’s interest 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), given the profit maximisation motives, executive directors find it 
difficult to engage in CSR. Given the review of the arguments above, the following 
hypothesis was formulated.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between executive directors’ dominated board 
and CSR of companies. 
2.4 Board Size and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Several authors argue that the board provide pool of potentially valuable resources for the 
firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman et al, 2000). Among these authors is Pfeffer (1972) who 
emphasised that larger board size assists the board to connect the corporation to its external 
stakeholders and gather resources, reputation and good corporate brand (Conyon and Peck, 
1998). This assertion is supported by the resource dependence view. Pfeffer (1972) argue that 
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increased resources could enhance the chances of corporation’s boards adopting CSR. Also 
large board provides enhanced expertise and skills that can be used to monitor an entrenched 
executive management team. This indicates that larger boards are well positioned to make 
strategic decisions. In his study, Pfeffer (1972; 1973) found board size to be positively related 
to CSR and concludes that larger board can act as a linkage between the community and 
environment because the board are interested in the long term interest of the firm.  
Other supporters of large board size were McKendall and Wagner (1997) and Kruger (2010). 
They argue that expert skills and advice are vital to the board by helping to reduce law suits 
against the corporation due to violations of environmental and human rights. Harjotoa and 
Rossi (2019) studied 156 Italian listed companies during the 2002–2014 period and found 
that there is a positive relationship between the presence of female directors and CSR. 
Fernandez-Gago et al (2016) found that CSR plays a mediating role on the relation between 
the independence of the board of directors, board size, women as directors and firm value. 
Kruger (2010) in examining the relationship between board and CSR using a panel of 2417 
PLCs in US between 1999 and 2007 found that the board size was positively related to CSR 
suggesting board size especially with higher fraction of insider and experienced directors 
have less negative events that lead to poor performances. 
Similarly, Coleman (2007) found board size to be positively related to maximisation of 
shareholders value and corporate performance arguing that given higher financial 
performances, mangers engage in CSR. This according to the author suggests that the board 
is not independent. Coleman (2007) uses panel data from 1997-2001 in four (4) African 
countries namely South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria in their study. Based on the above 
arguments of a positive relationship between board size and CSR, the following hypothesis 
was formulated. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between board size and CSR. 
2.5 Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Generally, diverse boards help the board to reach decisions quickly concerning environmental 
and other CSR issues, because the minority groups as members of the board bring their 
personal experiences, interests and commitments to the board (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). Also, Post et al (2011) argue that female directors 
favour CSR only if they are more in number on the board. For example, three (3) female 
directors or more are expected to have an impact on the board, for them to engage in CSR. 
However, according to the author, if the number falls below a minimum of three (3) female 
directors on the board, the tendency is that there is little or no impact of female directors on 
CSR. 
Empirically, the inclusion of women, ethnic minorities and people of different racial 
background into the board were found to be positively related to CSR (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Post et al, 2011). Also, Coffey and Wang (1998) argue that diversity of 
board was positively related to CSR because charities and donations are in line with the long-
term goal of company, and altruistic in nature. Coffey and Wang (1998) and Bear et al (2010) 
argue that board diversity reduces managerial control, improve board effectiveness in 
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decision making by checking management excessiveness. Moreover, diversity of board 
encourages the board to be responsive to a wider group of stakeholders (Goodstein et al, 
1994; Coffey and Wang, 1998, Williams, 2003). However, it was noted that in the absence of 
diversity in the board, managerial opportunism thrives which leads to inefficiency and poor 
performances (Coffey and Wang, 1998). 
Similarly, in their methodological approach, Bear et al (2010), Coffey and Wang (1998), and 
William (2003) used secondary data and multiple regression models to analyse the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR. As a result, they found women in board 
to be positively correlated to CSR. William (2003) notes that women directors are more 
inclined in using part of the corporation’s fund for charitable causes compared to less inclined 
male directors. The author concluded that charitable giving by firm maybe a way of 
enhancing their reputation and image, especially firms with bad corporate image may adopt 
corporate philanthropy as a way to amend their image and increase societal acceptability 
(Williams, 2003).   
Likewise, the board reaches quick decision concerning environmental issues when the board 
is diversified, particularly ethnic minorities who have superior knowledge of their 
communities will encourage the company to invest in CSR as a way of improving their 
relationship with the communities (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Huse et al, 2009). 
Therefore, based on the above arguments and their empirical findings, the following 
hypothesis was proposed.  
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between board diversity and CSR.  
3. Methodology 
The research is designed to use random effect estimator to test the specific effects of board 
composition, board size and board diversity on CSR. This involves the use of balanced panel 
data of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. The data were obtained from Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) fact book and supplemented by information from the annual reports. 
To ensure validity, reliability and replicability of the research study, the problem of 
multicollinearity (when two or more independent variables are correlated) were checked 
using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) while heterosedasicity (when residual error term 
variance not constant) was checked using Breusch-Pagan test (Baltagi, 2009). These 
problems were corrected using the robust standard error. The Hausman test was used to 
discriminate between the fixed effect and random effect estimators (Gujarati, 2007). The 
Ramsey Reset test results indicate no omitted variables while the Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation results means there was no autocorrelation (Baltagi, 2009). Stata 11 software 
was used for the econometric analyses of the panel data. 
3.1 Data Collection 
This study uses secondary data including CSR investments. The CSR investment is the 
amount spent by company on CSR activities per year. The amount invested in CSR is 
measured in Nigerian currency (the naira). In this study, CSR data was obtained from audited 
annual financial statements and annual reports of companies. This is the pre-tax earnings 
donated to charities, philanthropic activities and community development projects (Coffey 
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and Fryxell, 1991; Bartkus et al, 2002). This method of data collection is in line with Chai 
(2010) that employed philanthropy and charitable funds as a proxy for CSR. Chai states that 
the data has more reliability because it measures the actual amount spent on CSR.  
The NEDs were measured as the percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of 
directors in the board, while the executive directors were measured as the percentage of 
executive directors to total number of directors (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009).  The 
executive directors and NEDs’ information were obtained from NSE fact book 2003-2009 
(Dalton et al, 1998; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002).  As for the 
board size, it is the total sum of all directors at the end of the last fiscal year (Kassinis and 
Vafeas, 2002) and it was derived from NSE fact book from 2003-2009. The natural logarithm 
for the board size (lnBsize) was used.  
Gender diversity refers to the presence of women and ethnic minorities in the board (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999). In this study, due to unavailability of data, the board diversity was 
measured as the percentage of women in the board compared to the total board members 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998). Therefore, the number of women in the board was used as a proxy 
for board diversity. However, the number of ethnic minorities was not considered in this 
study due to incomplete data. Therefore, the information on board diversity regarding the 
number of women was obtained from NSE fact book between the period 2003 and 2009.  
The following control variables were used, financial performance, firm value, environmental 
risk, firm size, company age, industry effect, intangible assets and debt. Expectedly, this 
information was also obtained from the NSE fact book from 2003 to 2009 (Balabanis et al, 
1998).  
3.2 Model Specification 
This study uses balanced panel data of 174 PLCs in Nigeria between 2003 and 2009. The 
panel data regression is expressed as follows: 
Yit = α +Xit β +Eit....................(i)     
i =1........ N; t = 1............. T 
Where i  denotes PLC and t denotes time. α  is the scalar (constant), β is coefficient of 
determination and itΧ  is the observation on the independent variables. Eit is the error term. 
Expanding model on equation (i) to include the control variables (Z), the following model is 
specified as: 
The model specification is given as:  
Yit = αi +β1Xit +β2Zit + Eit....................(ii)     
Where: 
Y = CSR Investment (as amount spent on CSR practices per year) 
X = Board size, board composition and board diversity 
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Z = Control variables  
i = Public Listed Companies (PLC) observations 
t = Time period observation  
E = Error or disturbance term 
The Error Components Term (E) 
 
Eit = νi + uit....................(iii)     
The error term Eit comprises two parts, namely, the time invariant unobserved variable that 
does not change with time (Greene, 1993). This time invariant firm specific error term is 
denoted as νi (See equation iii). The second part of the error term, uit, is the time variant 
unobserved variable that varies with time and across firms. For example, factors such as 
general confidence in the company and board of directors’ ability may have an effect on 
market valuation, and influence managers to engage in CSR.  Failure to control this 
correlation within the model would yield biased results that will be unreliable (Del Brio et al, 
2006; Ramasamy et al, 2007).  
More importantly, the panel data study the dynamics of change and help to investigate the 
behavioural model over a time period. The panel data takes a closer look at the evolution of 
CSR in Nigeria as it varies from 2003 to 2009. Besides, the panel data enables the researcher 
to gain insights into the role of BOD as it affects CSR investment among 174 PLCs in 
Nigeria from 2003 to 2009 (Baltagi, 2009, Goss and Roberts, 2009). 
Therefore, adding the time invariant firm specific error term (νi). The panel data regression is 
expressed as follows: 
Yit = αi +β1Xit +β2Zit + νi + uit....................(vi)    
 
3.3 The Effect of Board of Director Characteristics on CSR  
Model 1 tests hypothesis 1. Model 1 estimates the effect of NED on CSR when all the control 
variables are held constant. In this study, Model 1 was illustrated below as: 
)1(1098765
4321
−−−−−−++++++
++++= +
ititititititit
ititititit
EEPSDebtTqROAbetaIndustry
NoemployeeIntangcompageNEDlnCSR
lnln
lnln
ββββββ
ββββα
 
Model 2 test hypothesis 2. Model 2 estimates the effect of the executive directors (ED) on 
CSR when all the control variables are held constant. In this study, Model 2 was illustrated 
below as: 
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Model 3 test hypothesis 3. Model 3 estimates the effect of the board size on CSR when all the 
control variables are held constant. In this study, Model 3 was illustrated below as: 
)3(1098765
4321
−−−−−−++++++
++++= +
ititititititit
ititititit
EEPSDebtTqROAbetaIndustry
NoemployeeIntangcompageBsizellnCSR
lnln
lnlnn
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Model 4 test hypothesis 4. Model 4 estimates the effect of the board diversity on CSR when 
all the control variables are held constant. In this study, Model 4 was illustrated below as: 
)4(1098765
4321
−−−−−−++++++
++++= +
ititititititit
itititit
EEPSDebtTqROAbetaIndustry
NoemployeeIntangcompageDivlnCSRit
lnln
lnln
ββββββ
ββββα
 
 
The control variables (Z) = 
ititititit
itit
EPSDebtROABetaIndustry
Noemployeecompage
lnln
lnln
+++
++
+  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Additionally, this study uses the regression instrument, random effect estimator to capture the 
effect of the board size on CSR and assume that, if the P-value of the coefficient of board size 
is positively statistically significant, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
Therefore, this research expects the coefficients of the following; non-executive directors 
( itNED1β )>0, executive directors ( ED1β )>0, BOD size ( itBsizeln1β )> 0, BOD diversity 
( itDiv1β )>0, and all to be statistically significant. 
 
Using the aforementioned variables in the model, the non-executive directors ( itNED1β ) 
estimate the impact of non-executive directors on CSR. ( ED1β ) estimates the effect of 
executive directors on CSR. ( itBsizeln1β ) measures the impact of board size on CSR. 
( itDiv1β ) measures the impact of board diversity on CSR.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
4. Presentation of Results and Findings 
The random effect estimator was used to test the effect of the different board characteristics 
on CSR because random effect estimator not only measures the effects of the unobserved 
variables but also reduces the omitted variable bias in the model (Wooldrige, 2003; Stock and 
Watson, 2007). In this study, the random effect estimator captures the model and the effects 
of all the independent variables on CSR. Likewise, the random effect estimator captures the 
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individual level differences among corporate bodies over time leading to a better finding for 
the regression coefficients (Gujarati, 2003). The next part of this section discusses the 
findings concerning the effect of NEDs on CSR. 
4.1 The Effect of NEDs on CSR  
Table 3 presents the findings on the effect of NEDs on CSR. The results show the 
relationship between NEDs and CSR investment was positive and significant at 1% (b = 0.78; 
p<0.01). The positive correlation means that as proportion of NEDs increases the CSR 
investments increases. The coefficient of determination of overall R square is 0.07, implying 
that the explanatory variables in the model accounted for 7% variation in CSR investment 
(Benson et al, 2009). The R square obtained in this study is higher than the findings of 
Benson et al (2009), which is 0.0086-0.017, and less than the findings of Andayani et al 
(2008) where R square is 0.37. However, the coefficient of determination (R square within) is 
0.21, implying that the explanatory variables in the model account for 21% variation in CSR 
investment within the firm. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
4.2 The effect of Board size on CSR  
The effect of board size on CSR is presented in Table 4. The coefficient for board size in the 
random effect estimation was positive and significant (b = 0.78; p<0.01). The effect of board 
size on CSR investment was positive and statistically significant at (1%). The positive result 
implies that larger board size increases corporate investment on CSR, whilst for board 
diversity, the findings reveal the effects of board diversity on CSR as insignificant. The 
presence of female directors was used as a proxy for board diversity. The random estimator 
produces insignificant results (b = -0.010; P=0.92).  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
5. Discussion of Results 
The findings of a positive and significant relationship to CSR imply that the NEDs favor 
companies to engage in CSR because of their long term interest for the company. The reasons 
could be attributed to companies’ compliance to the recommendations of the code of best 
practices earlier established in 2003 and revised in 2011 (SEC code 2003; 2011; Okike, 2007) 
which provides support for the board to invest in CSR, by recommending that companies be 
socially, ethically and environmentally responsible in their business conduct (Ibrahim and 
Angelidis, 1995; Ibrahim et al, 2003). The code also recommends that a minimum of 2 
independent NEDs be employ into the board. As a result, the NEDs in the board should at 
least be 50% of total board members and independent with lot of skills, knowledge and 
experiences. This empowers the NEDs to enhance board effectiveness by implementing all 
the code of corporate governance recommendation to the latter and at the same time, 
influence the board to invest in CSR, particularly if they perceive CSR as a positive tool for 
achieving competitiveness and corporate reputation (Johnson et al, 1993). These findings are 
consistent with the results of Johnson and Greening (1999) that found the inclusions of NEDs 
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in board to be positively related to CSR. In addition, Coffey and Wang (1992) reported a 
positive and significant correlation between NEDs’ and CSR. 
For the board size, the findings indicate a positive and significant relationship with CSR. The 
increase in board size is attributed to the inclusion of NEDs, ethnic minorities and women 
into the board which helps not only to diversify the board but to improve the board 
independence and its effectiveness (Coffey and Wang, 1998; Post et al, 2011). This support 
the work of Harjotoa and Rossi (2019) where they found that there is a positive relationship 
between the presence of female directors and CSR. In this paper the authors considered only 
gender diversity, but not the board diversity on a whole. 
 From international perspectives, increase in board size is viewed as occurring due to the rise 
of globalizations. Groups such as Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs), government, 
media, investors and communities request the board to become stakeholder-oriented 
especially by including NEDs, women, ethnic minorities and employees into the board, 
thereby giving them access to influence the board to invest in CSR. Also, the introduction of 
new directors into the board from diverse background, skills and knowledge can change the 
overall perception of the board and its directors and further influence them to invest in CSR. 
In addition, the effect of board size on CSR can also be explained by the perception of the 
new board members. If the new board members are inclined to CSR, then they are more 
likely to influence the board to engage in CSR practices. Likewise, the presence of ethnic 
minorities in the board can also influence the board members to engage in CSR. Certainly, 
the ethnic minority directors want their community to believe they are using their presence in 
the board to influence policies that favor the community. By influencing the board, the 
company invests in projects that create developments in the community they operate (Dunn 
and Sainty, 2009). 
In contrast to both the NEDs and board size, the results for the executive directors show that 
the executive directors are negative and significantly related to CSR at 1%. This result shows 
that higher numbers of executive dominated board do not favor CSR. The executive directors 
are members of the board that run the day to day operations of the company. They are very 
concern with satisfying the shareholder’s interest and making profits. This profit motives may 
hinder the executive directors from investing in CSR practices of the company. Second, if 
CEOs are not interested in CSR practices because of negative perception on CSR which the 
CEO perceives as a fine or cost that reduces profits, then the CEO can influence the board not 
to invest in CSR. Expectedly, Friedman (1970) along with Hughes (2001) and Bakan (2004) 
supports the above assertion that the legal responsibility of companies is to make a profit for 
investors and also that profit maximization is the sole responsibility of business 
organisations. 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 Theoretical contribution 
This paper focuses on fairness and moral obligation of companies in making contributions to 
the society. The normative compliance theory supports the findings and expects directors to 
bring their contacts, experiences and skills to the board for the benefit of the stakeholders. It 
is true that not every law has to be enforced through mandatory CSR, however so many 
regulations are still laiz-fair or voluntary CSR. The argument focuses on moral obligation of 
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the board being in position of power and authority to morally make decision that better the 
society or community. 
The study not only contributes to the understanding of how board characteristics affect CSR, 
but makes a theoretical contribution concerning the role of companies in society particularly 
the role of the board in satisfying multiple stakeholders. The normative compliance theory 
offered an explanation that the board uses its resources and directors’ skills to enhance not 
only social responsibility and firm performances but also the corporate reputation of the firm.  
Conversely, the findings between board diversity and CSR contradict the normative 
compliance theory that argues that the diverse board should invest in CSR. Generally, diverse 
boards help reach decisions quickly concerning environmental and other CSR issues because 
the minority directors bring their personal experiences, interests and commitments to the 
board (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Post et al, 2011).  
6.2 Practical Implications 
In practice, companies should change the way they view their responsibilities as solely an 
economic interest but know that they also have a moral obligation to be stakeholder oriented 
in their approach. They should extend their philosophies and policies beyond the economic 
interest to include the social interest. Also, their CSR practices should be embedded in their 
corporate philosophies and culture for long term survival of the company. The paper also 
contributes to the literature on corporate governance regulation in sub–Saharan Africa and 
how companies and managers take CSR, whether seriously or not.  The board ensures the 
implementation of policies, assessment mechanisms and internal oversight and control 
systems that identifies and addresses the actual CSR practices associated with a company’s 
operations. By this, companies can effectively compete and survive in the long run. 
In essence, the board have an important oversight role to play in ensuring that companies 
have systems in place to effectively manage risks such as reputational harm and legal liability 
associated with adverse social and environmental impacts. Also, the boards should ensure 
that they have the information they need to evaluate the effectiveness of a company’s existing 
management systems with regard to social and environmental hazards. As a result, they are in 
a position to raise questions regarding the processes and criteria by which management 
personnel evaluate the social and environmental risks that may be associated with a particular 
operating environments or business relationships, including those with host governments and 
joint venture partners.  
Also, the board members should emphasize the importance of ensuring that management 
personnel have the needed resources to respond to shifting stakeholder concerns and 
expectations in a manner consistent with the company’s values and strategic priorities. The 
board should employ their oversight approach that monitors compliance with established 
governance standards while also evaluating the potential impact of future expectations. 
Boards have a significant role to play in establishing and reinforcing an overarching set of 
expectations with regard to the short- and long-term management of social and environmental 
risks. 
6. Summary 
16 
 
This paper contributes to the boards and CSR debates and research by extending the 
literatures on organisational governance and commitment towards their social obligation. 
Based on research findings on how the board influences CSR, one can conclude that the 
social performance of company are very important and should be taking seriously if 
organisations are to stay competitively. The paper explores this through the normative 
compliance perspectives noting that the size of the board and Non-executive directors are 
very effective determinants and bears influence on CSR adoption by listed companies. The 
results of a positive and significant relationship between Non-executive directors and board 
size with CSR are similar to what is obtained by authors in developed countries. By this, the 
study not only contributes to the understanding of how board characteristics affect CSR, but 
also contributes to knowledge concerning the role of companies in society particularly the 
role of the board in satisfying multiple stakeholders.  
Also, the research points out the implication of the normative compliance theory and how 
good governance should be encouraged by understanding the board dynamics. The testing of 
the theory in the context of Nigeria contributes to the body of knowledge on Sub-Sahara 
Africa, particularly Nigeria which offers a developing country perspective.  
However, the limitation from this study is that the number of ethnic minorities was not 
considered in this study due to incomplete data. Therefore, the information on board diversity 
regarding the number of women was obtained from NSE fact book between the period 2003 
and 2009. Also, data employed for this paper is majorly limited to listed companies on the 
NSE and the study covers firms and industrial sectors within a single country but do not 
cover country to country differences or factors. 
Finally, the areas of future research should concentrate on the use of other methods such as 
the interview and survey methods. Also, the research in the future should be extended to 
cover other developing countries particularly in the Africa region, in order to determine the 
country to country specific effect in developing countries. Most empirical studies on country 
specific effects of the relationship between board characteristics and CSR policies and 
practices as it stands today, appear to be based on developed countries, therefore, calling for 
the need to examine these factors within the parameters of emerging economies, is important. 
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Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations 
 
BOD Board of Director 
BP  British Petroleum 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
ED Executive Director 
FP Financial Performance 
MNC Multinational Company 
NED Non-Executive Director 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NSE Nigerian Stock Exchange  
PAT Profit after Tax 
P/E Price Per Earnings 
E/S Earnings Per Share 
PLC Public Liability Company  
PRO Public Relations Officer 
R&D Research and Development 
ROA Return on Assets 
ROE Return on Equity 
ROS Return on Sales 
SEC Security and Exchange Commission 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
TMT Top Management Team 
UK United Kingdom 
USA United States of America 
 
 
 
 
Where: 
Table 1 shows that variables and their meaning  
Variables Meaning 
itlnCSR  Log of corporate social responsibility investment for ith firm and 
time t 
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itBsizeln  Log of board size for ith firm and time t 
itED  Executive Director for ith firm and time t 
itNED  Non-Executive Director for ith firm and time t 
itDiv  Board Diversity for ith firm and time t 
itlnCOMPage  Log of company age for ith firm and time t 
itIntang  Log of intangible assets for ith firm and time t 
iteelnNoemploy  Log of number of employees for firm size for ith firm and time t 
itIndustry  Industry effect or type for ith firm and time t  
itbeta  Firm beta or risk for ith firm and time t 
itROA  Return on assets for ith firm and time t 
itTq  Tobin q for ith firm and time t 
itlnDebt  Log of debt for ith firm and time t 
lnEPS  Log of earnings per share for ith firm and time t 
α  Alpha for ith firm and time t 
Eit  Error term or disturbance term 
ln  
 
Natural logarithm of variables 
Table 1- Source: Own computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Showing the Hypotheses, variables and model assumptions (A Priori 
Assumption) 
Hypotheses Dependent 
Variable 
Explanatory 
Variable  
Model Model 
Assumption 
Signs 
H1 CSR 
investment 
Non-Executive 
Director 
Model   1 B1> 1 +Ve 
H2 CSR 
investment 
Executive 
Director 
Model   2 B2 >1 +Ve 
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H3 CSR 
investment 
 Board Size  Model   3 B3 > 1 +Ve 
H4 CSR 
investment 
Board 
Diversity 
Model   4 B4 > 1 +Ve 
Source: (own computation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Showing the effect of NEDs and Executive Directors 
on CSR  
 
 Random effect estimator 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
NEDs 0.78(0.00)** *  
Executive directors  -0.85(0.00)*** 
Intangible Asset 0.01(0.10)* 0.012(0.14)* 
Number of employee 0.50(0.00)*** 0.49(0.00)*** 
Age of Company 0.37(0.00)*** 0.36(0.00)*** 
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EPS -0.00(0.99) -0.00(0.95) 
Risk -0.02(0.08) * -0.24(0.08) * 
ROA 0.01(0.07) *  0.02(0.06) * 
Industry effect -0.21(0.23)* -0.22(0.22) 
Tobin q -0.00(0.98) -0.000(0.98) 
Debt 0.01(0.45) 0.49(0.56) 
Number of groups(n) 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1151 1151 
Within R2 0.21 0.21 
Between R2 0.06 0.07 
Overall R2 0.07 0.07 
Intercept 9.52(0.00)*** 11.32(0.00) *** 
Heterosedasicity (chi2=4.84; p=0.028 i.e. p< 0.05)  
Multicollinearity(Mean VIF=1.25)  
Ramsey Reset test (chi2=21.83; p=0.00 i.e. p< 0.05)  
Woodridge test for autocorrelation results (0.2913)  
* significant at level p<0.1; ** significant at level p<0.05; *** 
significant at level p<0.01 
 
The results in parenthesis means that the b value is the 
coefficient while the p value indicates the level of significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Showing the effect of Board size and Board diversity on CSR  
 Random effect estimator 
Variables Model 3 Model 4 
Board size 0.78(0.00)***  
Board diversity  -0.010(0.92) 
Intangible Asset 0.012(0.13) 0.492(0.082)*** 
29 
 
Number of employee 0.46(0.00)*** 0.647(0.241)*** 
Age of Company 0.34(0.00)*** 0.005(0.012) 
EPS -0.001(0.90) -0.022(0.011) * 
Risk -0.03(0.07) * -0.001(0.014) 
ROA 0.01(0.09) *  0.02(0.06) * 
Tobin q 0.001(0.87) 0.001(0.88) 
Debt 0.01(0.46) 0.49(0.55) 
Number of groups(n) 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1151 1218 
Within R2 0.22 0.23 
Between R2 0.07 0.08 
Overall R2 0.08 0.08 
Intercept 9.51(0.00)*** 7.94(0.888)*** 
Heterosedasicity (chi2=4.84; p=0.028 i.e. p< 0.05) 0.88(0.349) 
Multicollinearity(Mean VIF=1.25) 1.49 
Ramsey Reset test (chi2=21.83; p=0.00 i.e. p< 0.05) 10.08(0.002) 
Woodridge test for autocorrelation results (0.2913)  
* significant at level p<0.1; ** significant at level p<0.05; *** 
significant at level p<0.01 
 
The results in parenthesis means that the b value is the 
coefficient while the p value indicates the level of significance 
 
 
 
